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MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs-ZoNING-lliGHT OF MuNICIPALITY AND PROPERTY OWNERS THEREIN TO OBJECT TO AMENDMENT OF ZONING ORDINANCE OF
ADJACENT MUNICIPALITY-The borough of Dumont in New Jersey amended
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its zoning ordinance to change one city block from a residential area to a district
in which business user would be permissible. The amendment occasioned
objections By certain boroughs which were adjacent to the reclassified block,
property owners in the adjacent boroughs, property owners in Dumont, and
property owners in the block itself. On suit in lieu of prerogative writ by these
parties, held, ordinance set aside. Where several boroughs are adjacent to the
block of the defendant borough, and in reliance on the residential character of
the whole area single family dwellings are erected in all the boroughs, property
owners in adjacent boroughs have vested rights to benefits from the zoning
restrictions of defendant borough, subject only to a proper exercise by defendant
of its police power. The adjacent boroughs are proper parties to contest the
validity of the amendment. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, (N. J.
Super. Ct. 1953) 100 A. (2d) 182.
Amendment or repeal of zoning ordinances is subject to the same restrictions
as the first enactment.1 Thus, a municipality may amend its ordinance only
where such amendment is reasonably necessary to the promotion of public
health, safety, morals, general welfare, or other legitimate exercise of police
power. 2 It is sometimes stated, as in the principal case, that property owners
have vested rights to the benefits from a zoning ordinance.3 However, since
legislative acts of a municipality are involved, it appears more nearly accurate to
say that property owners acquire no vested rights under a zoning ordinance,
and that amendments to, or repeal of zoning ordinances do not deprive property
owners of legal rights where the amendments are made in the public interest
to promote the health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 4 In order to have legal
standing to object to the validity of an ordinance or amendment, a pel1Son must
be an aggrieved party.5 Perhaps the most obvious example is that of the
property owner who is planning a business or factory in reliance on the zoning
ordinance only to have his lot reclassified as residential. It is in this situation
that the courts are most likely to give relief, holding that a property owner has
a right to rely on an ordinance not being changed unless the change is required
for public good.6 The indulgence of courts is especially great where the owner
bas obtained a building permit or license and bas started construction under

1 Shannon v. Building Inspector of Woburn, (Mass. 1952) 105 N.E. (2d) 192;
Trust Co. of Chicago v. Chicago, 408 ID. 91, 96 N.E. (2d) 499 (1951); Clifton Hills
Realty Co. v. Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 443, 21 N.E. (2d) 993 (1938).
2 Hasbrouck Heights Hospital Assn. v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 27 N.J. Super.
476, 99 A. (2d) 591 (1953); Rodgers v. Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. ll5, 96 N.E. (2d) 731
(1951).
3 People v. Stanton, 211 N.Y.S. 438 (1925); Pelham View Apartments v. Switzer,
224 N.Y.S. 56 (1927).
.
4 Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club of Baltimore City, 179 Md. 390, 18 A. (2d) 856
(1941); Page v. Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P. (2d) 280 (1946).
5 8 McQmLLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §25.292 (1950).
6 Western Theological Seminary v. Evanston, 325 ID. 511, 156 N.E. 778 (1927);
Zilien v. Chicago, 415 ID. 488, 114 N.E. (2d) 717 (1953); Phipps v. Chicago, 339 ID.
315, 171 N.E. 289 (1930); Rex v. Borough of Lansdale, 66 Montg. 186 (1953).
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it7 However, where the amendment is really necessary to the public good, it
will be held valid in spite of individual injury. 8 Also well within the definition
of an aggrieved party is the neighboring property owner whose land -suffers in
value because part of the residential district in which he lives is changed to a
commercial area. Here again the courts usually declare amendments invalid
when they are not reasonably founded in the public good,9 but uphold them
when they are not arbitrary.10 A much more difficult question is presented
when objection is made by a property owner who is not within the zoning
district affected by the amendment. Though the problem does not often occur,
it is presented squarely by the principal case, for several of the plaintiffs were
outside the zoning district There is little authority on the question, but some
cases lend support to the proposition that one outside the zoning district cannot
question the validity of an ordinance,11 while others support the opposite rule.12
As long as a party owns property near enough to suffer an appreciable loss in
value and is within the municipality, there appears to be no reason not to
consider him an aggrieved party. The problem is still more difficult when, as
in the principal case, the complaining party is beyond both the zoning district
and the municipality.13 The extensive repercussions which might result from
requiring that an amendment be reasonable in its effect on property not only
in the town in which it was enacted, but also in all the territory contiguous to
the town, justify the view that owners of property outside the municipality
should not be able to object.14 In holding that adjacent municipalities, as well
as property owners in those municipalities, are proper parties to question the
validity of an amendment, the court in the principal case has extende'd the
concept of the aggrieved party beyond any authority .which has been discovered.
It has been held that a borough may prosecute an appeal from a court order
setting aside a zoning board .order denying a petition for a variance from the
zoning ordinance provisions;15 and that where plaintiff's property is on the
edge of municipality A, the court will consider the presence of a business area
across the street from plaintiff's property, even though the businesses are in
7 Coldwater v. Williams Oil Co., 288 Mich. 140, 284 N.W. 675 (1939); People v.
Bales, 224 App. Div. 87, 229 N.Y.S. 550 (1928); Willis v. Town of Woodruff, 200 S.C.
266, 20 S.E. (2d) 699 (1942).
BOsbom v. Darien, 119 Conn. 182, 175 A. 578 (1934); Brady v. Keene, 90 N.H.
99, 4 A. (2d) 658 (1939).
9Wilcox v. Pittsburgh, (3d Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 835; Clifton Hills Realty Co. v.
Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 443, 21 N.E. (2d) 993 (1938).
lOEggebeen v. Sonnenburg, 239 Wis. 213, 1 N.W. (2d) 84 (1941); State v. Superior Court, 155 Wash. 244, 284 P. 93 (1930); Cassel Realty Co. v. Omaha, 144 Neb.
753, 14 N.W. (2d) 600 (1944).
11Kimberly v. Town of Madison, 127 Conn. 409, 17 A. (2d) 504 (1941); Fairfax
County v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 44 S.E. (2d) 9 (1947).
12 Appley v. Township Committee of Township of Bernards, 128 N.J.L. 195, 24 A.
(2d) 805 (1942).
13 This was the situation in Kimberly v. Town of Madison, note 11 supra, and the
court held that the plaintiff had no standing to question the validity of the ordinance.
14 See 21 ILI.. B.J. 34 (1933).
15 Perelman v. Board of Adjustment of Borough of Yeadon, 144 Pa. Super. 5, 18 A.
(2d) 438 (1941).
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municipality B, in determining the reasonableness of municipality A's ordinance.16 There seems to be no authority going beyond this point, so it appears
that the New Jersey court is alone in its declaration that one borough may
question ~n amendment to the zoning ordinance of an adjacent borough.

Howard N. Thiele, Jr.

16 Taylor v. Glencoe, 372 lli. 507, 25 N.E. (2d) 62 (1939); Forbes v. Hubbard, 348
lli. 166, 180 N.E. 767 (1932); Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E.
427 (1931).

